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NOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
ZONING-Snoh Zoning: Must a Man's Home 
Be a Castle? 
It is a well-documented fact that a shortage in housing is one 
of the most critical problems confronting the United States in the 
1970's.1 Neither is it a secret that the lack of decent housing strikes 
with particular intensity at the poor and the black and other minor-
ity groups. While the more affluent members of society are able to 
flee to the wide-open spaces of suburbia, the disadvantaged urban 
dweller can do little more than watch the central city decay and 
crumble around him. When, as one study has pointed out, ninety-
nine per cent of the vacant land of the twenty largest urban areas 
is located outside the central cities,2 this problem becomes crucial. 
Since the people who do move to the suburbs are typically white 
and those who remain within the central city are generally black, 
the result of this process tends to be the creation of two econom-
ically and racially disparate societies.8 
Of course, traditional notions of a truly democratic ethos run di-
rectly counter to such a trend. But to millions of Americans living 
in metropolitan ghettos there exists a far more persuasive reason 
why suburban areas should be made accessible to minority and low-
income groups. The fact is that an ever-increasing number of in-
dustrial concerns and businesses are locating plants in suburban 
areas. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported that for the pe-
riod 1960-1967, sixty-two per cent of all industrial buildings and 
fifty-two per cent of all commercial buildings were constructed out-
I. The most well-known exposition of this problem is found in NATL. ADVISORY 
CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT]. In twenty-
three cities experiencing racial disorders, "inadequate housing" was high on the list of 
specific grievances of blacks. Id. at 4. One of the Commission's major recommendations 
was that the supply of housing should be expanded on a "massive basis"-specifically 
six million low- and moderate-income housing units by 1968. Id. at 260. See also M. 
BROOKS, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 13 (Am. Soc. of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory 
Serv. Rep. No. 254, 1970). 
2. Snob Zoning, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 20, 1969, at 7. 
l!. KERNER REPORT, supra note I, at ll8-20. The Kerner Report points out that 
as of 1966, metropolitan areas outside the central city were 96% white. Id. at ll8. Fur-
thermore, according to the report the following eleven major cities can expect to be-
come more than 50% black by the indicated dates (Washington, D.C., and Newark, 
New Jersey, being already in excess of 50% black): 
New Orleans 1971 St. Louis 1978 
Richmond 1971 Detroit 1979 
Baltimore 1972 Philadelphia 1981 
Jacksonville 1972 Oakland 1983 
Gary 197l! Chicago 1984 
Cleveland 1975 
Id. at 216. 
[339] 
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side the central cities of metropolitan areas:1 Moreover, more than 
fifty per cent of all new jobs created in the 1960's in the standard 
metropolitan areas were outside the central city.5 Thus a significant 
corollary to the inability to move to the suburbs may well be de-
creased opportunity to obtain desired employment.<1 
It is clear that it is not personal preference that keeps the dis-
advantaged within the walls of the inner city. Real obstacles pre-
venting the construction of low- and moderate-income housing in 
suburban areas do exist. Minimum-lot-size requirements-"snob 
zoning"--constitute one significant obstacle; others include the ex-
clusion of apartments from residential areas and the exclusion of 
houses with less than a statutorily prescribed floor area. 7 An attack 
on the legality of snob zoning, then, would represent only one step 
in the struggle to utilize the land available in suburban areas more 
fully for housing purposes.8 Unquestionably, however, an attack 
on snob zoning would be an important step in that struggle. 
Whereas the cost of a four-acre9 lot might be prohibitive for most 
urban dwellers, the cost of a 6,000-square-foot lot would probably 
be within the means of many more persons, despite the fact that 
lot prices may not diminish commensurately with a decrease in 
minimum lot size.1° Further, in addition to the effect on one's abil-
ity to afford a lot, large-lot zoning may have "significant effects" 
on the cost of housing as well.11 For example, builders who might 
otherwise erect a certain size house on one lot might not do so on 
a larger lot, following an unwritten rule that the price of a lot 
4. BUREAU OF LABOR STATirnCS, U.S. DEPT. OF l.ABOR, CHANGES IN URBAN AMERICA 
5 (B.L.S. Rep. No. 353, 1969). 
5. Id. at 1-5; KERNER REPORT, supra note I, at 217. According to NAACP figures, 
new job openings in the New York City metropolitan area for the years 1952-1966 
were in a ratio of seven-to-one in favor of the suburbs over the central city, while 
in San Francisco the ratio was eight-to-one in favor of the suburbs. Snob Zoning, 
THE NEW REPunuc, Dec. 20, 1969, at 7. 
6. M. BROOKS, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 17 (Am. Soc. of Planning Officials, Planning 
Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 254, 1970). "When companies move away from a city to a 
suburb with no living space for blue-collar workers the worker has the option of either 
travelling to the job from the city or else quitting. In too many instances, civil rights 
groups say, he's had to quit, and this in tum has contributed to unemployment in city 
areas." Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1970, at 13, col. 1. 
7. NATL. COMMN. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 
34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215-17 (1968) [hereinafter DOUGLAS REPORT]. 
8. Even if all minimum-lot-size requirements were removed, however, single-
family housing may still not be within the financial reach of the very poor absent 
extensive governmental subsidy. See KERNER REPORT, supra note I, at 217. To eliminate 
effectively the exclusion of the poor and black from suburban housing, any remedial 
attack requires, inter alia, in addition to the elimination of snob zoning and the crea-
tion of a government-sponsored housing subsidy, a reduction of zoning restrictions on 
minimum floor space and on multifamily dwellings. 
9. One acre equals 43,560 square feet. 
10. A one-half-acre lot will cost less than a one-acre lot in the same area, but will 
cost more than half the price of the one-acre lot. See text accompanying note 14 infra. 
11. DOUGLAS REPOllT, supra note 7. at 213-14. 
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should be a certain percentage of the total price of the lot plus a 
completed house.12 Moreover, snob zoning may result in an increase 
in the price of land improvements such as streets, sidewalks, gutters, 
and sewer lines. For instance, in St. Louis County, Missouri, lots 
of 6,000 square feet had an improvement cost of 1,925 dollars, 
whereas one-acre lots had an improvement cost of 4,375 dollars.18 
Finally, snob zoning often may have the effect of increasing the 
price of land available for smaller lots and multifamily units by 
limiting the amount of land available for these uses.14 
Moreover, the report prepared by the National Commission on 
Urban Problems (Douglas Report) has stated: "Large-lot zoning 
is a common and widespread practice in many major metropolitan 
areas."111 According to that report, twenty-five per cent of the me-
tropolitan communities with populations in excess of 5,000 permit 
no single-family dwellings on lots smaller than one-half acre.16 Spe-
cific examples may be helpful in understanding the dimensions of 
this problem. In Connecticut, more than half of the vacant land 
zoned for residential use in the entire state is zoned to provide 
for minimum lots of between one and two acres.17 Of 85,200 acres 
of vacant land zoned for single-family residential use in Cuyahoga 
County (Cleveland), Ohio, only thirty-three per cent is zoned to per-
mit lot sizes of one-half acre or less, and seventeen per cent is zoned 
for lot sizes of two acres or more.18 Similarly, of the vacant land 
zoned for single-family residential use in the New York City me-
tropolitan area, ninety per cent requires a minimum lot size of 
one-quarter acre, and two thirds of this is zoned for one-half acre or 
larger.19 
Thus it appears that large-lot zoning is a significant force in 
preventing a great number of people from gaining access to unde-
veloped suburban land and its concomitant benefits. This Note will 
analyze and evaluate the legal theories that may be employed to 
attack snob zoning in the courts.2° First, the feasibility of attacking 
12. Id. at 214. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 215. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 214-15. 
20. At present, much of the attack on exclusionary zoning is directed against those 
ordinances or laws barring multifamily dwellings. See Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 
293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), revd., 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970), in which the district court enjoined a proposed 
referendum on an ordinance of the city council amending the zoning ordinance to 
authorize a federally approved low-cost housing project, on the grounds that the 
proposed referendum would impede implementation of federal policy and thus be 
void under the supremacy clause (U.S. Co:-.ST. art. VI), and that as the primary motive 
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snob zoning via the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment will be examined. The second part of this Note will delineate 
alternative judicial responses to snob zoning that are couched in 
more conventional zoning-law terms. 
I. THE EQUAL PROTEGTION ATIACK 
Perhaps the most far-reaching challenge to minimum-lot-size 
zoning requirements may be based on the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment.21 The obvious effect of snob-zoning 
laws is to exclude poor people from certain residential areas solely 
because they cannot afford the minimum allowable acreage and 
house. The equal protection clause, it can be argued, does not allow 
a municipality to enact an ordinance that has this effect. If snob-
zoning ordinances did not exist, these same people arguably could 
move into these areas since they could afford a smaller house on a 
smaller lot. 
In determining whether the above argument will stand up under 
current equal protection analysis, it should be noted that there 
exist two quite distinguishable tests for application of the equal 
protection clause. The traditional analysis-the "rationality" test-
is employed typically when a form of economic regulation is under 
attack.22 The inquiry under the rationality test is essentially whether 
behind the referendum. was racial prejudice, the referendum would violate the equal 
protection clause (The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court 
because it did not find adequate proof of a discriminatory racial motive.); Dailey v. 
City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), in which the court enjoined 
defendant municipal corporation from continuing to refuse to issue a building permit 
for a multiple-family housing project, primarily since the court found that the refusal 
to re-zone to a high-density-use classification was a direct result of a desire to exclude 
blacks and other minority groups; Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), 
in which the court held invalid an ordinance that did not permit apartments anywhere 
in a township. See also M. BROOKS, ExCLUSIONARY ZONING 18-22 (Am. Soc. of Planning 
Officials, Planning Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 254, 1970) (discussion of the Ranjel case). 
21. It is assumed for purposes of part I of this Note that the only objectionable 
feature of the snob-zoning statute is in its de facto discriminatory effect against the 
poor. For a treatment of statutes that are purposefully discriminatory, see text accom-
panying notes 78-80 infra. 
In addition, an initial question of standing might be raised if minimum-lot zoning 
ordinances are challenged under the equal protection clause. A detailed consideration 
of standing is beyond the scope of this Note. However, some preliminary considerations 
of standing are in order. Basically two types of plaintiffs might bring an equal protec-
tion challenge: (1) land developers who desire to build housing of a type not permitted 
in an area by the zoning ordinance, and (2) potential low-income residents who desire 
to purchase a lot on a large-lot-zoned area but who cannot afford the minimum lot 
permitted. The latter category would be alleging the direct injury of a statutory denial 
of an asserted constitutional right, and should have standing on that basis. The land-
developer plaintiff, however, would find it more difficult to establish the requisite 
standing. Such a plaintiff would seem to be asserting the rights of the excluded 
potential resident, and standing would probably not exist on this basis unless the 
court found that this was the only practical manner in which the contemplated action 
could be brought. 
22. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957). 
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the classification drawn by the legislation bears a conceivably reason-
able relation to a permissible state objective sought to be achieved 
by the statute.28 If such a relation does exist, the statute will be 
valid; only the "invidious" or "arbitrary" classification is outlawed.24 
Under this approach the courts give great deference to legislative 
classifications, with the result that in only one case in the past three 
decades has the Supreme Court struck down economic legislation 
through use of the rationality test.211 
The most recent application of the rationality test by the Su-
preme Court, which resulted in the validation of a state law, is 
Dandridge v. Williams.26 Dandridge involved a challenge to the 
Maryland "standard of need" which imposed an upper limit on 
the amount of assistance a family might receive under the Federal 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.27 The 
suit was brought by several AFDC recipients with large families who 
argued the the maximum-grant limitation discriminated against 
them in violation of the equal protection clause because of the size 
of their families. The Supreme Court reversed a federal district 
court decision that had held the grant limitations to be in violation 
of the equal protection clause. 28 The Court pointed to several valid 
state concerns--such as providing incentives for family planning 
and encouraging gainful employment-that the grant limitations 
were designed to achieve. Although admitting that the Maryland 
statute contained imperfections that might create hardships for 
some, the Court saw nothing invidious or irrational in these stat-
utory discriminations. Thus applying the rationality test, the Court 
found the Maryland statute plainly valid, and concluded with a 
reminder that the federal courts may not impose upon the states 
their own views of "·wise economic or social policy."29 
Applying the approach used in Dandridge to minimum-lot-size 
23. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). 
24. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
25. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), in which the Court invalidated the Illinois 
Community Currency Exchanges Act of 1955 which imposed certain restrictions on all 
currency exchanges handling money orders, except those handling United States Post 
Office, American Express Co., Postal Telegraph Co., or Western Union Telegraph Co. 
money orders. The essence of the Court's holding was that the exceptions would not 
serve the purpose of the Act (protection of the public), for although American Express' 
characteristics may have made it unnecessary for the statute to subject it to regulation 
presently this might not be so in the future. Moreover, the Court was deeply impressed 
by the fact that the statute created a "closed class" and thus gave American Express an 
economic advantage. 
26. !197 U.S. 471 (1970). 
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
28. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968). 
29. 397 U.S. at 486. According to the Court, the fact that this Maryland statute 
was social, and not economic, legislation bearing on the "most basic economic needs 
of impoverished human beings" was no reason not to apply the traditional "old" 
analysis. !197 U.S. at 485. 
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requirements would probably result in those requirements being 
sustained. The control of population density has long been recog-
nized as a valid state objective,30 and many other state concerns-
such as water pollution control--could also be set forth in response 
to an attack on minimum-lot-size requirements. Moreover, zoning 
laws appear to be an extremely rational way to achieve these objec-
tives, and the discrimination resulting from these laws seems no 
more invidious than that alleged in Dandridge. Thus, the rationality 
test under the equal protection clause does not appear to provide a 
sufficient doctrinal basis on which a successful attack against snob 
zoning can be brought. 
In certain cases, however, the Supreme Court has employed a 
more vigorous test, which may be designated the "close-scrutiny" 
test.31 Under this test, the Court subjects the legislative classifications 
to a more searching scrutiny, and invalidation results when the dis-
tinctions are not necessary-as opposed to "reasonably adapted"-to 
effectuate a compelling-as opposed to a permissible-state inter-
est.32 The close-scrutiny test has been applied only in cases in which 
the classification attacked has been drawn along lines which are 
"constitutionally suspect,"33 such as race,84 or in which it has a chill-
ing effect on a particularly favored right.85 Thus the first inquiry 
that suggests itself is whether snob-zoning laws fall within that cate-
gory of legislative classifications that bring the close-scrutiny test into 
play. 
At the broadest level, one can argue that whenever a legislative 
classification is effectively drawn along lines of ability to pay, the 
close-scrutiny test should apply. Beginning with Griffin v. lllinois,88 
30. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
31. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
32. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 63S (1969). Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
33. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v. Virginia 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). See text accompanying notes 38-46 infra. 
34. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
35. The phrase "particularly favored right" is used in this Note because it best 
comprehends the type of rights that may bring the classification within the close-
scrutiny analysis when those rights are infringed upon. The Court apparently is 
undecided whether the right must be "constitutional" or "fundamental" and "basic." 
Arguably, the latter class may be broader than the former. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ("fundamental"-right of interstate movement); McDonald v. 
Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) ("basic,'' "fundamental"-voting); Levy 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) ("basic"-recovery of damages for wrongful death 
of mother); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("fundamental" 
-voting). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 n.16 (1970), in which 
the Court distinguished Shapiro as involving the "constitutionally protected freedom 
of interstate movement" (emphasis added). See also notes 55-61 infra and accompanying 
text. 
36. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
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and continuing through a fairly discernible line of cases in the crim-
inal procedure context,87 the United States Supreme Court has held 
generally that wealth-or ability to pay-as a classifying fact may 
be constitutionally impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. 
More recently, in McDonald v. Board of Elections88 the Court stated 
that wealth is a factor "which would independently render a clas-
sification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting 
judicial scrutiny."39 Thus, it can be argued that insofar as minimum-
lot-size requirements that are embodied in a county or municipal 
zoning ordinance prevent those unable to afford, for example, a 
four-acre lot from acquiring a lot upon which to build a house, 
the state is responsible for creating a classifying fact based upon 
wealth,4° and relying on the statement in McDonald, the close-scru-
tiny test should be apposite. 
However, the above argument does not survive a close analysis. 
In the first place, McDonald did not involve wealth as a classifying 
fact; the holding in that case was that Illinois' failure to provide 
absentee ballots for unsentenced inmates awaiting trial was not in 
violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the statement in 
McDonald that classifications based solely on wealth are constitu-
tionally suspect is pure dictum. Moreover, the case cited by the 
Court in McDonald for the proposition that wealth is a suspect 
classification was Douglas v. California,41 a case in which the Court 
held that a state's failure to appoint counsel for an indigent's first 
appeal constitutes a denial of equal protection and due process. As 
in Griffin, the Court's decision in Douglas was made in the context 
of criminal procedure, and thus the equal protection argument 
was reinforced by-and perhaps subsumed under-the due process 
argument. The only other case in which the Supreme Court has 
invoked the close-scrutiny test to hold an economic classification 
by wealth unconstitutional under the equal protection clause was 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,42 which involved an attack 
37. See, e.g., Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam); 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 478 (1963); Long 
v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 
(1970). 
38. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). 
39. 394 U.S. at 807. 
40. The Court felt that it was a fact of no constitutional significance that the 
Illinois statute involved in Griffin did not on its face discriminate between those with 
means and those without. It was sufficient that the effect was discriminatory. 351 U.S. 
12, 17 n.11 (1956). 
41. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
42. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Cf. Bynum v. Connecticut Commn. on Forfeited Rights, 
410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), 
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on a state-imposed poll tax. Indeed, when presented with the op-
portunity, the Court has failed to extend the fourteenth amend-
ment's protection of the poor beyond the areas of criminal procedure 
and voting rights.43 Recently, the Court has upheld the Illinois sys-
tem of public-school finance against claims that the plan discrim-
inated between wealthy and poor school districts;44 has refused to 
hear argument concerning the constitutional validity of a Georgia 
law requiring a defendant in a summary-eviction procedure to post 
a bond if he demands a jury trial;45 and has dismissed an appeal 
challenging a Connecticut law requiring a tenant who appeals a 
summary-eviction judgment to post a bond for the protection of 
his landlord.46 On the other hand, the Court has been steadfast in 
its consideration of wealth as a suspect classification in the criminal 
procedure context. For example, in Williams v. Illinois,41 the Court 
passed on the validity of a state law that provided that if a defen-
dant had not paid any fine that may have been imposed by the 
time his prison sentence had expired, he would have to remain in 
jail to work the fine off at a rate of five dollars per day. "Applying the 
teaching of the Griffin case," the Supreme Court concluded that the 
statutory scheme did constitute an "impermissible discrimination 
that rests on ability to pay" and held "that a State may not consti-
tutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute 
a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine."48 
In sum, it is apparent that statutory discrimination along the 
43. E.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), upholding the right of a state to 
select jurors from a list of taxpayers. It should be noted, however, that Brown was not 
argued on economic equal protection grounds. 
44. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam), affg. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. ill. 1968). 
45. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967). 
46. Simmons v. West Haven Housing Authority, 399 U.S. 510 (1970) (per curiam). 
The equal protection argument would seek to invalidate the law insofar as it operates 
to deprive those too poor to post the bond of the option of appellate review. 
47. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
48. 399 U.S. at 241-43. A case very similar to Williams is Morris v. Schoonfield, 
399 U.S. 508 (1970) (per curiam), in which the Court was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of a Maryland law requiring persons who cannot afford to pay 
court fines to satisfy the obligation by serving time in jail. Williams and Morris are 
distinguishable in that in the latter case the total imprisonment (for the principal 
offense and for nonpay:nent of fines) did not exceed the maximum allowed by law 
for the principal offense (see Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158, 164 (D. Md. 1969)). 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Morris to the district court for reconsidera-
tion in the light of Williams (decided the same day) and of intervening state legisla-
tion. The disposition the Court might have made of Morris may be deduced from an 
examination of the following language from Williams: 
The State is not powerless to enforce judgment against those financially unable 
to pay a fine; indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination 
since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for 
nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other COJ'• 
viction. 
399 U.S. at 244. 
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lines of wealth will not, in and of itself, result in an application of 
the close-scrutiny test. Further, it is not likely that the Supreme 
Court will extend the close-scrutiny test to cases involving dis-
crimination on the basis of ability to pay, because to do so would 
constitute a vast encroachment on, if not an elimination of, the 
rationality test. The rationality test, as the Dandridge case indicates, 
still has considerable vitality.49 
If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, wealth as a classifying 
fact is by itself insufficient to bring the close-scrutiny test into 
operation, some other factor must be responsible. The crucial fac-
tor seems to be the particular interest at stake. Arguably it is this 
factor that accounted for the results reached in Griffin and Harper 
-wealth as a classifying fact became important only because those 
cases involved a conflation of discrimination by ability to pay and 
of infringement upon a favored interest. The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Shapiro v. Thompson50 supports this analysis. In Shapiro 
the Court applied the close-scrutiny test to a Connecticut law im-
posing a one-year residence requirement for welfare recipients. 
Only in an indirect way did Shapiro involve discrimination by abil-
ity to pay. What the Court deemed significant was that the Con-
necticut statute exercised a chilling effect on the rights of United 
States citizens to change residence from state to state.51 
If it is true that the touchstone of a close-scrutiny analysis is 
the interest involved, and that the element of economic discrim-
ination is only of secondary importance, the significant inquiry 
must be whether the interest of the individual who desires to erect 
a single-family dwelling but who cannot afford a four-acre lot is 
sufficiently similar to the interest of the indigent criminal defendant, 
49. Nor have lower federal courts shown much inclination to extend the close-
scrutiny doctrine. In Maya v. De Baca, 286 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal 
dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969), involving a claim that the New Mexico garnishment 
law violated equal protection by discriminating against wage earners vis-a-vis those 
who are not wage earners, the court said that relief of the "economically depressed" 
was a legislative, not a judicial, chore. Similarly, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. 
Supp. 968, 973 (D. Conn. 1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 938 (1969), it was argued 
that the Connecticut requirement of filing fees to initiate divorce proceedings was 
unconstitutional because it discriminated on the basis of affluence, or the lack of it. 
The court disagreed, stating that civil actions lacked the sanctity of voting and cases 
involving imprisonment. But cf. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 
1969), in which the court held that a complaint attacking the Florida school district 
finance scheme as violative of equal protection sufficiently alleged a basis of relief on 
a substantial constitutional question to justify convening a special three-judge district 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964). Following criminal procedure and 
voting, civil procedure would seem to be the next logical area for extension, of the 
dose-scrutiny doctrine, despite Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (see text ac-
companying note 45 supra), and Simmons v. West Haven Housing Authority, 399 U.S. 
510 (1970) (per curiam) (see text accompanying note 46 supra). See Lee v. Habib, 424 
F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
50. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
51. 394 U.S. at 629-30. 
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the poor person unable to afford a state poll tax, or a person desir-
ing to change his state of residence. In other words, do snob-zoning 
laws impinge upon a sufficiently favored interest to warrant invoca-
tion of the close-scrutiny test? An analysis of this question reveals 
considerations both for and against an application of the close-scru-
tiny test in the context of snob zoning. 
A traditional notion of American jurisprudence has been that 
the amount of justice available to a criminal defendant ought not 
to depend on how much he is able to pay.52 Likewise, a true democ-
racy is premised on the belief that the opinion of the poorest 
artisan is as valuable as that of the richest plutocrat.63 And the 
right of any citizen to travel freely from state to state has long been 
deemed an integral benefit of national citizenship.54 Thus, the in-
terests involved in Griffin, Harper, and Shapiro are all rights pos-
sessed by a citizen vis-a-vis the government. The close-scrutiny test 
has not yet been extended by the Supreme Court to cover interests 
of a citizen vis-a-vis other citizens, and it is in this area that snob-
zoning laws fall. 
On the other hand, the interests that have been protected by 
the close-scrutiny test have been either "fundamental" or "consti-
tutional."55 It is plausible to assert that the interest involved in 
equal access to land for residential use is as "fundamental" as the 
interest involved in Griffin. Griffin involved nothing more than 
access -to an appeal which the Supreme Court admitted the state 
might constitutionally abolish. 56 Only after the state allowed any-
one an appeal, the Court concluded, was it constrained to make it 
available to everyone, regardless of ability to pay. Viewed in this 
light, the interest involved in the snob-zoning case compares more 
favorably with the right held to be "fundamental" in Griffin. Fur-
ther, few would maintain that equal access to land, at least to the 
individual, is less crucial than the right to vote, however much we 
proclaim the value of the latter. 57 
52. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
53. This assumption underlies provisions in many state constitutions to the effect 
that the franchise will not be conditioned on property qualifications. See, e.g., CAL. 
CoNsr. art. I, § 24; IND. CoNsr. art. I, § 23; id. art. II, § 2. 
54. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Ward v. Maryland, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Pas-
senger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849). 
55. See note 35 supra. 
56. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). 
57. Learned Hand once referred to the "illusory belief" that his vote determined 
anything. To Hand, voting served as a force galvanizing the citizenry into feeling as 
though each individual is a part of a common venture. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 73-74 (1962). Whereas society may have an interest in seeing one otherwise ex-
cluded from the "common venture" of society exercise the franchise, it is doubtful that 
this individual will attach the same importance to an act that is at best only psycho-
logically gratifying. 
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However, it can be argued that Griffen, Harper, and Shapiro 
can be distinguished from the hypothetical snob-zoning case on the 
ground that criminal procedure, voting, and the right to travel in 
interstate commerce are all matters covered by the Constitution, 58 
whereas housing is not. It is plausible to assert that as between 
matters falling within an area of constitutional concern and those 
not, only the former should be beneficiaries of the close-scrutiny 
analysis. Thus, even if equal access to housing, regardless of wealth, 
was deemed a "fundamental" right, it is arguable that unless that 
right is also a matter of constitutional concern it should be dealt 
with under the traditional equal protection analysis-the ration-
ality test. This is true because an extension of the close-scrutiny 
analysis to "fundamental" interests would inevitably embroil the 
courts in the difficult task of delimiting those rights that may be 
deemed worthy of being labeled "fundamental," a process not dis-
similar from that of the gradual encompassing of various provisions 
of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause. 119 However, the argument would continue, even due process 
incorporation offers more concrete guidelines than would equal pro-
tection incorporation of "fundamental" interests. In the former case 
there existed at least some limit to the extent of the incorporation: 
the first eight amendments to the Constitution. 60 In the latter case, 
however, this built-in limitation is not present-almost any interest 
may be deemed "fundamental"-and the possibility exists that the 
judicial branch would be compelled to render value judgments 
without the aid of any proper guidelines. 
One partial reply to the argument that the close-scrutiny test 
ought to be applied only when the interest at stake is "constitu-
tional," and not merely "fundamental" may be found in the Su-
58. The right to travel in commerce is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, perhaps, it has been suggested, because it is a right "so elementary" as "to be 
a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." United States 
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966). Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 n.16 
(1970). Travel has also been deemed to be a "privilege" under either art. IV, § 2 or the 
fourteenth amendment. See cases cited in note 54 supra. 
59. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), holding the sixth amendment 
right to trial by jury in criminal cases applicable to the states since it is "fundamental 
to the American scheme of justice." 391 U.S. at 149. 
60. Some cases, however, have suggested that due process incorporation may not be 
limited to specific guarantees in the first eight amendments. In effect, additional guar-
antees are read into the Bill of Rights. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958), the Supreme Court noted that freedom of association, which is nowhere 
explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, was a first amendment right. Likewise, in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court recognized the right of 
privacy as being within the penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth 
amendments. This approach, carried to its logical conclusion, would detract from any 
certainty which might otherwise be attached to the Bill of Rights incorporation pro-
cess. Justice Black has been a consistent critic of the penumbra approach. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,507 (1965) (Justice Black, dissenting); Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (Justice Black, concurring). 
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preme Court's recent statement that the equal protection clause 
forbids a state to apportion benefits and services "according to the 
past tax contributions of its citizens."61 Such apportionment in-
volves discrimination based on wealth and ability to pay just as do 
minimum-lot-size requirements. What this similarity may indicate 
is that whenever a state provides a service it must do so without 
favoring the interests of the wealthy over those of the less well-to-do. 
Since the majority of the services rendered by the state concern 
nonconstitutional matters-for example, garbage removal-it ap-
pears that the Court may be willing to extend greater protection 
to more prosaic interests. And even though snob zoning may not 
be, strictly speaking, a service extended by the state, the conceptual 
leap does not seem overly difficult to make.62 
Moreover, it has been asserted that in a series of recent decisions 
the Supreme Court has elevated the concept of equal access to hous-
ing to "a matter of most serious social and constitutional concern,"63 
thus being worthy of special judicial regard. The cases cited to 
support this proposition are Shelley v. Kraemer,64 Reitman v. Mul-
key,65 and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company.66 Although it is 
likely that the racial aspect of these cases was at least equally as im-
portant as the housing aspect, 61 they indicate, at the very minimum, 
an awareness on the part of the Supreme Court of the extreme 
significance of adequate housing. It is conceivable that this awareness 
could take the form of an extension of the close-scrutiny test to 
snob-zoning laws. Since the courts might well apply the close-scru-
tiny test to snob-zoning laws, it is appropriate at this point to deter-
mine what result an application of that test would yield. 
Under the close-scrutiny test the focus of judicial inquiry is upon 
both the state's objective and the means employed to effectuate that 
61. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (dictum). The Supreme Court's 
most recent pronouncement bearing on this dispute is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970), in which the interest was not a "freedom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" 
(397 U.S. at 484); Shapiro was distinguished on the ground that that case involved the 
"constitutionally protected freedom of interstate travel" (397 U.S. at 484 n.16). 
62. Of course, there is a problem in determining whether zoning is the type of 
service the Court was referring to in Shapiro. It may well be that zoning, traditionally 
regarded as an exercise of the state's police power, is not to be comprehended within 
the word "service." Moreover, it is likely that the Court, when it referred to the 
equal protection clause, may have meant a rationality-test equal protection analysis; 
even under this analysis it is doubtful that the equal protection clause would have 
permitted a city to schedule garbage collection with reference to the tax base of a 
given neighborhood. 
63. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the 
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 767, 790 (1969). 
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
65. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
66. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
67. Cf. Coons, Clune 8: Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu-
tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 305, 381 (1969). 
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objective.cs In the context of snob-zoning laws, the Court must 
examine, first, the state's objective that large-lot zoning is designed 
to achieve, and, second, whether the zoning requirements are a 
necessary means of attaining the permissible objective. Since the 
objectives a state may attain through zoning are delineated by 
statute, any restriction that serves an objective other than those 
that are statutorily sanctioned may be dealt with without reference 
to the equal protection clause.69 Typically, however, state statutes 
are framed broadly to allow zoning to further the general health 
and welfare of the community involved.70 Despite its lack of spec-
ificity, this objective has long been recognized as a valid state con-
cern71 and would probably be considered a "compelling" state 
interest for purposes of the close-scrutiny analysis. 
Thus, the paramount issue becomes whether large-lot zoning 
is a "necessary" means of attaining the permissible objective. Be-
cause of the paucity of decisions that have been based on the close-
scrutiny test, it is unclear when any given measure will be deemed 
"necessary." Of course, much will depend on the objective sought 
to be attained. The basic theoretical question would seem to be 
whether a less restrictive alternative exists that would achieve the 
same result.72 If so, the minimum-lot-size requirement should be 
invalidated. An example or two should clarify this analysis. It is 
clear that water pollution control is a permissible objective under 
a state zoning law. And minimum-lot-size restrictions would serve 
to further the goal of clean water by limiting the number of people 
-and thus the amount of sewage-who would be allowed to live on 
a given tract of land. It is also clear, however, that this is not a 
"necessary" means of controlling water pollution. The problem 
might also be solved, in a costlier manner perhaps, by providing 
for proper drainage and sewage disposal methods. Similarly, pro-
viding for a "green belt" or open area would qualify as a permis-
sible zoning objective. Although large-lot zoning would result in 
the preservation of open land, the same result could well be achieved 
by "cluster zoning."73 In both of the above examples, the fact that 
68. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra. 
69. See text accompanying notes 78-82 infra. 
70. See note 81 infra. 
71. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926). 
72. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960): "In a series of decisions this 
Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of the 
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving 
the same basic objective." See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). 
73. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 
Pa. 504, 529, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965). See also notes 101-08 infra and accompanying 
text. 
352 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69 
large-lot zoning is not a necessary means to achieve the state objec-
tive should lead a court to conclude that the minimum-lot-size 
requirements are unconstitutional. 
Essentially, then, the role of the close-scrutiny analysis would 
be to examine arguments that attempt to justify large-lot zoning 
as a means to further an end. The outcome of each individual case 
may well hinge upon the existence of suitable alternatives for ob-
taining the statutory objective. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion. 
First, in order to bring minimum-lot-size requirements under the 
close-scrutiny analysis a court must find either that wealth as a clas-
sifying fact is constitutionally suspect, as is race, or that the interest 
represented by equal access to land and housing despite ability to 
pay is a specially favored interest. Second, if either of these findings 
is made, a successful attack on a snob-zoning statute will still require 
a plaintiff to show that the restriction is not necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest. At this point in time, and given the rela-
tively recent appearance of the close-scrutiny analysis, any conclusion 
concerning the constitutional validity of snob-zoning laws must be 
tenuous at best. The foregoing discussion was designed to set forth 
the issues and relevant precedents that any court will have to deal 
with when it is confronted with such a problem. 
In the final analysis, the constitutional question regarding large-
lot zoning may well be determined by considerations of public pol-
icy. The impact of the Court's invalidation of zoning laws would 
undoubtedly be much greater than the elimination of a simple fee 
as was done in Griffin or a poll tax as was done in Harper. As a 
matter of strict logic, if it is held that a four-acre restriction violates 
the equal protection clause, can it be said that a one-half acre re-
striction does not? Indeed, it is arguable that a logical extension 
of the equal protection analysis would demand an end to all zon-
ing for single-family residences since many people cannot afford 
the expenses attendant upon home ownership, whatever the size 
of the lot. On the other hand, avoidance of this extreme result74 
74. Though this may be an extreme result, it would be unfair to say that a success• 
ful constitutional attack on snob zoning would herald the demise of the system of 
value. Moreover, the downfall of snob zoning would not imply that all economic dis• 
tinctions are invalid. This is true because snob zoning involves state complicity in the 
discrimination, and the ability of a private businessman to charge whatever price the 
market will bear would not be impaired. Moreover, not even every economic discrimi-
nation by the state would necessarily henceforth be constitutionally impermissible. 
The issue of tuition at state universities is a relevant example. This is the same type 
of de facto economic discrimination that is involved in snob zoning-tuition costs 
prevent a disproportionate number of poor people from obtaining a college education. 
First, it appears that a state might more readily justify the imposition of tuition than 
large-lot zoning. Furthermore, an elimination of the tuition requirement for those 
unable to pay would result in a direct subsidy in favor of the economically disadvan-
taged, which would not be the result if large-lot zoning were eliminated. Admittedly, 
the effect of Griffen is to subsidize those unable to pay, but Griffen may be distinguished 
on the ground that the criminal process, unlike a college education, is not something 
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arguably may be achieved only at the high cost of allowing the 
courts to draw rigid, and perhaps meaningless, lines with regard 
to what size lot is constitutional and what size lot is not. 
Neither of the above extremes appears desirable. Zoning, in-
cluding single-resident and minimum-lot-size zoning, can achieve 
many positive results. Since the question is essentially one of policy 
and planning-problems peculiarly within legislative, and not ju-
dicial, competence75-it might be unwise for the courts to delineate 
an inflexible and universal constitutional maximum. One judicial 
approach that would avoid either extreme would be for the courts 
to hold some relatively high lot-size minimums constitutionally per-
missible if only a small part of the municipal area is zoned for high 
lot-size minimums and the rest is zoned according to a sliding scale 
that leaves a substantial part of the municipality open for de-
velopment of small lots. Such a pragmatic approach would avoid 
much of the supposed difficulty in deciding whether any given lot-
size restriction is per se invalid. However, more long-range plan-
ning is necessary if America is to retain any of her natural beauty 
and at the same time take adequate account of the problems of the 
economically deprived. This planning can only be accomplished 
by legislative organs.76 The crucial question, however, is whether 
anything can be done while the legislature is deciding to act or if 
the legislature refuses to act at all. The fact that those who would 
benefit most by the elimination of large-lot zoning are poor and 
badly organized may indicate a significant degree of legislative re-
luctance to deal with the problem. Several alternative responses 
for the courts are suggested below that would allow the courts to 
play a significant role in remedying legislative inaction without 
becoming embroiled in the difficult issues of an equal protection 
analysis. However, if these solutions prove only partially adequate 
voluntarily invoked. In the context of criminal procedure the state is involved; however, 
only a very few defendants would consider themselves beneficiaries of a service. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970), however, seems to cast doubt on extensive 
subsidization of the indigent even in the criminal procedure context. See note 48 supra. 
75. It was this lack of judicially manageable standards that troubled the district 
court in Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. Ill. 1969), afjd. sub nom. 
Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam). See Frank, Political Questions, 
in SUPREME CoURT AND SUPREME LAW 36, 38-39 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). 
76. In this regard, it should be noted that Senator Jacob Javits of New York has in-
troduced a bill that would "bar certain Federal subsidies for things like water and 
sewer facilities for suburbs that maintain 'exclusionary' zoning practices." Wall St. J., 
Nov. 29, 1970, at I, col. 6. 
One factor determining judicial incompetence to act on a given matter is the 
extent to which information to which the court lacks access is needed to solve the 
problem. A rational approach to land utilization obviously depends on a perusal of 
population statistics, demographic trends, ecological needs, economics, and much more. 
This information is not readily available to a court. More important, a court does 
not afford the type of forum necessary to digest this information and arrive at sound 
policy conclusions. See generally Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND 
SUPREME LAW 36 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). 
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and the legislatures fail to respond, it is submitted that it would 
be both appropriate and necessary for the courts to begin invalidat-
ing snob-zoning laws as violative of the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. 
II. ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
Undeniably, minimum-lot-size restrictions can, and often do, 
perform valuable functions. For one thing, they serve to maintain 
the rural nature of the surrounding countryside, an objective that is 
especially desirable in an era of increasing metropolitanization. More-
over, the elimination of low-density zoning may cast burdens upon 
an area with which it is unable to cope, given its present state of 
development, in matters such as fire and police protection, schools, 
and highway construction.77 While these may be compelling factors 
that militate against disturbing the restrictions in areas already de-
veloped, they offer no justification for imposing low-density stan-
dards on areas that are totally undeveloped. 
Several approaches may be followed in attacking minimum-lot-
size requirements imposed upon heretofore undeveloped areas. One 
argument that courts have been particularly sympathetic to is that 
the restrictions are nothing more than ill-disguised attempts to bar 
"undesirables"-white or black-from an area, to segregate gener-
ally economic classes, or to avoid the burdens of future growth. 
In short, whenever the primary purpose of a minimum-lot-require-
ment appears to be founded in a desire to discriminate or to exclude 
potential entrants, the requirement ought to, and more than likely 
will, be held invalid. · 
Thus, in Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. 
Carper, 78 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that two-
acre minimum lot sizes were invalid because the practical effect of 
the restriction would be to prevent low-income persons from living 
in the area. The court held that in enacting the zoning ordinance, 
the zoning board had intended that it have this exclusionary effect. 
The evidence that was most significant was that before the two-acre 
restriction was imposed, applications for subdivisions had been nu-
merous, whereas after the enactment of the ordinance, there had 
been no such applications. Similarly, in National Land b Invest-
ment Company v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,79 the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated a four-acre minimum-
77. See Flora Realty 8: Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1035, 1040-41, 246 
S.W .2d 771, 775, 779, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952). 
78. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). Cf. Flora Realty 8: Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 
ll62 Mo. 1025, 1040-41, 246 S.W .2d 771, 779 (1952); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Ad-
justment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). 
79. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). 
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lot-size requirement because its "primary purpose" was to exclude 
newcomers, thereby enabling the community to escape the burdens 
of growth. 80 
These are obvious results given the statutorily permissible ends 
that zoning may achieve. For if the basic justification of zoning is 
that it is to enhance the general welfare of the area zoned,81 a court 
should not uphold a zoning ordinance that is primarily designed 
to achieve other ends. 0£ course, a corollary to this line of reas-
soning is that if the zoning ordinance is otherwise well grounded 
as serving to promote health, safety, and welfare, it will not be held 
invalid because discrimination or exclusion results.82 
Another problematical aspect of current zoning laws that is eas-
ily capable of a judicial solution is the fact that each zoning juris-
diction, whether county or local, is allowed to pursue whatever 
zoning policy it desires, in disregard of nearby zoning jurisdictions.83 
"General welfare" is typically interpreted as referring solely to the 
needs of the area doing the zoning.84 Thus, a small municipality 
that zones vacant land on the outskirts of an overcrowded metrop-
olis need not consider the housing problems in the larger city in 
order to fulfill the general-welfare requirement. The remedy for 
this situation lies in a broader interpretation of the term "general 
welfare." It would be desirable if zoning bodies themselves would 
break down the artificial boundaries that have made each munic-
80. That the exclusion of newcomers was the primary purpose seemed clear from 
the relative weakness of the town's attempted justifications of the requirement, which 
were held unsound by the court: (1) ensurance of proper sewerage and protection of 
the town from water pollution; (2) an inadequacy of township roads; (3) preservation 
of the rural, "historical" character of the area. 419 Pa. at 523-32, 215 A.2d at 608-12. 
81. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2961(3) (1969): "The provisions of the zoning 
ordinance shall be based upon a plan designed to promote the public health, safety, 
morals and general welfare •••• "; N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 175 (McKinney 1966): "For 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the 
community, the board of trustees of a village is hereby empowered, by ordinance ••• 
[to impose regulations and restrictions on building sizes, types, and uses, etc.]." See 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 372 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
82. Cf. Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 491, 99 N.Y.S. 280, 286 
(Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1950). 
83. See text accompanying notes 86-94 infra. 
84. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Sun Bldg. &: Dev. Co., 199 Ark. 333, 134 S.W.2d 
582 (1939); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P .2d 34 (1954); Gru-
ber v. Mayor and Township Comm., 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962); Katobimar Realty 
Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955). In those cases in which a court states 
that conditions in surrounding zoning districts must be considered, it is usually for the 
purpose not of ameliorating the conditions per se, but of determining whether these 
conditions render a certain restriction of the principal zoning jurisdiction unreason-
able. For example, in Pioneer Trust &: Sav. Bank v. Village of Oak Park, 408 ru. 458, 
97 N.E.2d 302 (1951), one of the reasons for invalidating an Oak Park ordinance limit• 
ing the permissible height of apartment buildings to thirty-five feet (2½ stories) was 
the fact that in an area directly across the street from the property in question the 
village of River Forest allowed apartment buildings of fifty feet (three stories) in 
height. 
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ipality or county a veritable sovereignty for planning purposes. In 
the absence of this voluntary remedy, it might not be beyond the 
competence of the judiciary to examine a given restriction and in-
validate it if it appears blatantly to disregard the pressing needs of 
contiguous or nearby areas.85 
There are judicial precedents exemplifying this approach. In 
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,86 the New Jersey su-
preme court rejected the argument that a village owes no duty to 
an adjoining municipality in deciding whether to approve a change 
in zoning from a residential to a business district. To allow such a 
proposition, the court said, "would be to make a fetish out of in-
visible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of the principle 
of zoning."87 The court's determination in Dumont was aided by 
an expression of legislative policy to the effect that municipal plan-
ning boards should pay regard to "neighboring territory" and the 
"environs" of the municipality.88 However, the Dumont result seems 
both desirable and defensible-given the advantages of regional 
zoning-even without the expressions of legislative policy that were 
present in that case. Moreover, if a zoning statute itself evinces no 
such express policy, it would be entirely appropriate for a court to 
look to subsequent legislative enactments for a policy favoring 
cooperation with neighboring areas. 89 
However, in Beshore v. Town of Bel Air,90 the Maryland court 
of appeals limited the Dumont result to the situation where one 
zoning area merged imperceptibly into the other. In other words, 
where there is a definite demarcation between two contiguous areas, 
the Dumont regional-zoning approach might be inapplicable. Thus, 
it appears that in general the courts have not imposed on zoning 
boards a requirement of looking beyond the municipal borders. 
Nevertheless, both legislatures and courts should realize that ulti-
85. Cf. Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Mu-
nicipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962). What might be even more desirable is 
a more extensive use of regional planning, provided by many state zoning laws. See, 
e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, § (2) (1966); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-
Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 515 (1957). 
86. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See also Schwartz v. Congregation Powolei 
Zeduck, 8 IlL App. 2d 438, 131 N.E.2d 785 (1956). 
87. 15 N.J. at 247, 104 A.2d at 446. 
88. 15 N.J. at 247, 104 A.2d at 446. The same approach was adopted in Hamelin v. 
Zoning :Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. New Haven County 1955). 
89. An example of the use of subsequent pronouncements of legislative policy in 
interpreting a statute is provided in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 
(1941). In that case, the Supreme Court decided whether a violation of the Sherman 
Act and Clayton Act existed by referring to the public policy expressed in the sub-
sequently enacted Norris-LaGuardia Act. The policies expressed in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were given determinative effect, even though that Act was not aimed 
expressly at the situation involved in the Hutcheson case. 
90. 237 Md. 398, 414-15, 206 A.2d 678, 687 (Ct. App. 1965). 
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mately no one can be insulated from the urban crisis.91 As was stated 
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "Although municipalities ... 
have not yet been compelled to recognize values that transcend mu-
nicipal lines, they certainly should be encouraged to consider re-
gional needs and be supported by the courts when they do so for 
sound reasons."92 In this respect, the now-famous dictum from the 
classic zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,93 is apposite: 
"It is not meant by this . . . to exclude the possibility of cases 
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest 
of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to 
stand in the way."94 
Another possible judicial approach to the problem of snob zon-
ing is for the court to consider the nature of the uses to which con-
tiguous land within the same zoning area is put. For example, in 
Lasalle National Bank v. City of Highland Park,95 the Illinois su-
preme court invalidated a minimum-lot-size requirement of three 
acres because the nature of the uses to which the surrounding land 
was put96 made it extremely unlikely that there would be a market 
for three-acre lots. In a subsequent case the same court held uncons-
titutional, as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, a 20,000-square-foot minimum as applied to plaintiff's 
property, where the surrounding area included an airbase, ceme-
teries, and a light industrial district, with a railroad in close proxim-
ity.97 The court reasoned that because of the existence of these 
nonresidential uses, any adverse effect of higher density had already 
occurred.98 The result of these two Illinois decisions seems eminently 
sound, both from the standpoint of the local zoning area and that of 
the general welfare. For it is clear that the main justification for low-
density zoning-the desire to maintain quietude and a rural charac-
ter99-is no longer present when the surrounding area has been 
developed in a light-industrial or high-density-residential manner.100 
91. KERNER REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
92. Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 287, 225 A.2d 321, 326 (1966). Whereas the 
cases supporting the broader view have arisen generally in the context of applications 
for use variances, the policy behind the argument is also applicable to larger aspects 
of zoning such as density restrictions. 
93. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
94. 272 U.S. at 390. 
95. 27 Ill. 2d 350, 189 N.E.2d 302 (1963). 
96. On one side was a golf course; on two other sides were residential districts 
with 20,000-square-foot-minimum restrictions. On the fourth side was a parcel of 
land owned by a religious order which had been granted a variance to allow the con-
struction of a temple and a parking lot. 27 Ill. 2d at 351-52, 189 N.E.2d at 303-04. 
97. LaSalle Natl. Bank v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. 2d 497, 192 N.E.2d 909 (1963). 
98. 28 Ill. 2d at 500-01, 192 N.E.2d at 910. 
99. Cf. Elbert v. Village of North Hills, 28 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
County), revd., 262 App. Div. 856, 28 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1941). 
100. In Marquette Natl. Bank v. County of Cook, 24 Ill. 2d 497, 182 N.E.2d 147 
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Thus, when the public need for the allowance of high-density zoning 
is greatest (because of the jobs created by the newly arrived suburban 
industry), the justification for low-density zoning may well be at its 
lowest point. 
A final judicial approach to the snob-zoning problem-one in-
volving not a small degree of daring and initiative-would be for 
the court to approve the density requirements set by a zoning ordi-
nance for a particular area, but allow the area to be developed in 
the fashion of "cluster zoning."101 Cluster zoning allows a munic-
ipality or county to achieve the same low density as large-lot zoning 
·without requiring large lots.102 At the same time, the aggregation 
of residential structures into a more compact area, with the remain-
ing land set aside for the common use of the area, helps reduce 
road and utility costs.103 The net result of a cluster-zoning plan is 
to preserve the large-lot "country estate" atmosphere, which in 
turn adds to the general welfare by maintaining green-belt areas,104 
and, at the same time, to open up the area for lower-income people 
and reduce development costs. Moreover, often the natural features 
of the terrain will render cluster zoning more economical than any 
other plan. A further advantage of this method of lot siting is that 
it allows a zoning board to be flexible in its plans and to engage 
in a good deal of creativity. The cluster can assume almost any 
shape desired and this fact assumes particular aesthetic importance 
when the structures themselves have become standardized,1°5 as is 
the case with most residential housing developments. 
A judicial decision to allow cluster zoning would essentially be 
one of compromise. The situation might arise when a developer 
has submitted a plan for proposed development that includes lot 
sizes smaller than are required by the zoning ordinance.106 If the 
(1962), the court held that where the trend in the zoning area had been to lots of 
10,000 square feet, a restriction of plaintiff's property to a 20,000-square-foot minimum 
was invalid. 
101. J. RosENTHAL, CLUSl'ER SUBDIVISIONS (Am. Soc. of Planning Officials, Planning 
Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 135, 1960). Rosenthal has identified two primary characteristics 
of the "true" cluster subdivision. The first identifying trait is a grouping of several 
houses together on a tract of land, set off from other similar clusters. The second 
characteristic is the presence of a large undeveloped area held for the common enjoy-
ment of the various clusters. Id. at 2. 
102. Id. at 17. 
103. Id. at 5. 
104. National Land &: Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 
504, 529, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965). 
105. J. RosENTHAL, supra note 101, at 12. 
106. In most cases, the economic advantages to the developer of bringing a cluster-
zoning suit may not be clear, and for that reason, he would have no incentive to 
bring the suit of his own initiative. One possible procedure would be for a group 
representing potential residents of the area-for example, the NAACP-to approach 
a landowner developer and ask him to submit a plan to the zoning board that provides 
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plan is refused by the appropriate zoning body, a court could follow 
one of two courses on appeal. It could invalidate the density re-
quirements on one of the grounds discussed above.107 Alternatively, 
if the density forecast by the developer is the same as that required 
by the zoning requirement, the court could reverse the zoning board 
on the ground that the restrictions of large-lot zoning are unwar-
ranted since the goals of large-lot zoning can be achieved at least 
as well by cluster zoning. Hence, large-lot zoning would, under the 
circumstances, be unreasonable, and therefore invalid.108 
The cluster-zoning approach is offered only as an alternative 
to the other judicial approaches discussed, and it should be used 
only when the circumstances allowing for their application are not 
present. Cluster zoning itself has several drawbacks. Although such 
an approach will result in decreased lot minimums for the area 
involved, the density requirements for that area will remain the same. 
Consequently, under widespread application of the cluster approach 
it is possible that insufficient land will be devoted to housing, and 
that a concomitant inordinate amount of land will be utilized for 
open areas. In the long run, the cluster solution will not promote 
the most efficient use of land for housing purposes. Given an ever-
increasing population, coupled with an outward migration from 
the greater metropolitan areas, the ultimate solution to the prob-
lem of snob zoning must be higher-density guidelines. 
Indeed, it must be recognized that the preferable solution is 
through the legislative, rather than the judicial, process. As stated 
earlier,109 the expertise and resources required for land-use plan-
ning that takes into account ecological needs and demographic 
trends are essentially within the legislative grasp. In the interim, and 
until legislatures or existing zoning bodies begin to react more posi-
tively to the needs of a larger portion of society than a privileged 
few, the courts should not hesitate to face the challenge and enter 
the fray to secure more equal access to land for those who are pres-
ently denied such access because of snob zoning.no 
for minimum lot sizes lower than those allowed by the ordinance. When and if the 
plan is refused by the board, the interest group-who would have the most immediate 
concern in having the plan approved-would bear the costs of any litigation. 
107. See notes 78-100 supra and accompanying text. 
108. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 2!18, 104 A.2d 441 (1954); 
Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. New Haven County 
1955). Cf. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 
504, 529, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965). 
109. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 
110. It should be noted at this point that even if the equal protection challenge 
to large-lot zoning is successful, it is possible that private parties will be able to 
achieve much the same result as the large-lot zoning ordinances through the use of 
private restrictive covenants. If this result does develop, potential residents arguably 
could challenge these covenants by utilizing the doctrine announced by the Supreme 
